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Abstract
The nancial crisis has raised some concern about the quality of information
available on some traded assets on the securities markets to market participants and
regulators. Asset-backed securitization in general got partial blame for the paucity
of liquidity on bank balance sheets and the consequent credit crunch. After the
Asset-Backed Security (ABS) market fell to near inactivity in 2009, the US federal
governments Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provided backing
and a boost to the issuance of asset-backed securitization. In this market condition,
given the nature of ABS, it is di¢ cult for them not to be relatively illiquid, and this
has resulted in unacceptable levels of market risk for most investors. Their liquidity
before the crisis was driven by a market in continuous expansion, fed by Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Conduits, and other low capitalized term-transformation
vehicles. Nowadays, the industry is concerned with the ongoing ABS reforms and
how these will be implemented. This article reviews the ABS market in the last
decade and the possible consequences of the recent regulatory proposals. It proposes
a retention policy and the institution of a new nancial body to supervise the quality
of the security in an ABS pool, its liquidity, and the model risk implied by the issuers
valuation model.
JEL Classication: G39; G18
Keywords: Asset Backed Security; Government Policy and Regulation
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1 Introduction
Since the 1930s, securitization has become one of the most important innovations
to emerge in nancial markets. The period between 1997 through to 2004 witnessed
growing emphasis on risk management and investors were no longer just seeking
to maximize the return but also seeking diversied risk strategies. The growth in
securitization was further perpetuated by the bursting of the dot.com bubble in
2001. As investors switched to alternative securities in the form of corporate bonds,
the xed income market became saturated, credit spreads tightened and high quality
corporate bonds became scarce thereby making portfolio diversication extremely
di¢ cult.
Banks reap many advantages by securitizing assets rather than keeping them on
their books. For example, by packaging their portfolios of credit card receivables
as securities, major commercial banks have been able to free capital for alternative
investments. For example, as the leading bank issuer of credit cards, Citibank also
emerged as the largest issuer of securities backed by credit card receivables.
Investor acceptance of asset-backed securitization grew as the market matured.
Consequently, these securities were trading at a spread over Treasury bills that made
them a relatively low-cost source of funding for many companies. Credit card-backed
securities, which in 1991 represented the largest single category of new issues (41
percent of the dollar volume), settled into a trading range of 65 to 105 basis points
(0.65 to 1.05 percentage points) over Treasury with comparable maturities. Issues
collateralized with auto debt, the second-biggest market component (30 percent),
traded at a spread of just 60 to 80 basis points, while o¤erings supported by home
equity loans, the third largest (21 percent) category, moved in a range of 120 to 160
basis points.
Since the 80s, asset-backed securities evolved out of the mortgage-backed secu-
rities market, which had developed in the seventies when interest rates surged and
institutions found themselves saddled with residential mortgages that were earning
less than what they were paying for deposits1. When compared with mortgage-
backed securities, asset-backed issues have been relatively una¤ected by swings in
interest rates. The reason is that the car loans and other loans backing the securities
have shorter maturities than mortgages, and therefore people are less likely to re-
nance when interest rates fall. Thus, asset-backed securities resemble noncallable
bonds. Asset-backed securities enable depository institutions, nance companies,
and other corporations to transform the nature of their balance sheets (i.e., raise
1In 1999 the Clinton administration started to make pressure on Fannie Mae to expand mortgage
loans to low income borrowers.
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cash by borrowing against assets) and develop new sources of capital. Assets such
as credit cards, automobile loans, and home equity loans are packaged as the collat-
eral for intermediate-term (i.e., maturity of one to ve years) securities and sold in
the market or even to private investors. The broadest classication of securities in
global asset-backed markets is into (1) ABS (asset-backed securities), (2) collateral-
ized debt obligations (CDOs), (3) commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
(4) residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and (5) Repackaged Notes Pro-
grammes. The main classes of securities in the pure vanilla securitization markets
today are commercial ABS, (1) consumer ABS, (2) CMBS, (3) Non-performing loans
(NPLs) and (4) RMBS.
In its purest form this process of pooling illiquid assets into nancial instruments
is called securitization. Thus, securitization is a means by which banks can directly
raise funds from the capital market to nance their assets or "non-conventional"
projects (i.e. projects which may not conform to the mainstream lending models
of banks). Participants in this market were traditionally small (poorly rated) en-
tities and as such in mainstream markets would have been subject to severe costs
associated with the issue of debt. These organizations would securitize investments,
sell an AAA-rated tranche (say 90% of the underlying pool), a BBB-rated tranche
(say 8% of the pool) and retain an unrated rst loss security of the remaining 2%
and retain rights to the excess cash ows. Given the nature of the market, the non-
bank participants were not in direct competition with banks. However, all this has
changed over the last ten years as structured nance has grown and non-banks have
started lending to mainstream borrowers. Furthermore, retail banks also started
adopting this structured nance model as it provided them with a means through
which to leverage equity and increase lending without requiring additional capital.
Table 1 shows the global issuance of ABS between 2005-2009. As we can see there
was a signicant growth of Residential Mortgage Backed Security (RMBS) and sub-
prime RMBS between 2005-2007, while the Asset Backed Security market, over the
same period, was much smaller. It is likely that this growth is also linked to the
increasing demand for residential houses over the same period (particularly in US
and Europe)2..
This article reviews the ABS market in the last decade and the possible conse-
quences of the recent regulatory proposals suggested by the Security and Exchange
Commission (the so called "skin in the game" and full discosure of the pool). It
2It is surprising that, given the importance of securitization, very few empirical studies have
attempted to explain why there has been a growing demand of securitization instruments. Indeed,
very important questions have not received, in my view, the necessary attention. For example, has
securitization been mainly used as a nancing tool or for regulatory arbitrage ?
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proposes a retention policy and the institution of a new nancial body to supervise
the quality of the security in an ABS pool, its liquidity, and the model risk implied
by the issuers valuation model.
Table 1: Global Issuance of Asset backed Securities. Data Source, Dealogic.
2 The Asset Backed Securities Market
Securitization is a nancing process where illiquid assets (mortgages, credit cards,
student loans, etc..) are pooled and converted into liquid nancial instruments
which are then sold in the capital market to raise (cheap) funds. The issuer uses
these nancing vehicles to raise cash which is then used to expand her balance
sheet. Generally, the securitization of asset backed securities (ABS) is handled by
a so called special purpose vehicle (SPV), which issues tranches of di¤erent risk 3.
Generally, the SPV will create and also sell the securities. Thus, if the SPV and
the assets originator have separate balance sheets, the latter can remove the risky
assets from the balance sheet and free capital for further investments. Suppose that
3Tranches with the rst lien (senior tranche) rated AAA and riskier tranches called junior
tranches. Generally originators retain junior tranches such as equity tranches.
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the assets originator is a nancial institution holding illiquid assets on the balance
sheet, and assume that the return on alternative investments is very high. The
securitization process allows the originator to free capital which can then be used
to gain extra return.
Table 2: European Issuance by Collateral-2009. Data Source, Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association.
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Table 3: US Issuance by Collateral-2009. Data Source, Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association.
Table 2 and Table 3 show the evolution in the US and Europe of various struc-
tures (Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS), Commercial Mortgage Backed
Securities (CMBS), Collateralize debt Obligation (CDO) and ABS) between 2009:Q1
and 2009 Q4. For example, the European ABS4 issuance includes auto, credit
card, leases, loans, receivables. The European CDO issuance only includes euro-
denominated issuance regardless of the country of origin of the collateral. A sub-
stantial percentage of CDOs are backed by multi-jurisdictional collateral. Historical
CDO issuance totals have been revised due to periodic updates of the sector.
The US ABS issuance includes auto, credit card, home equity, student loan,
equipment leases, manufactured housing. ABS issuance totals have also been re-
vised due to periodic updates of the sector. The US CDO issuance only includes
US-denominated issuance regardless of the country of collateral and may therefore
include European transactions which are denominated in US dollars. Historical
CDO issuance totals have been revised due to periodic updates of the sector.
Mortgage Backed Securities are the predominant type of securitization vehicle
in both US and Europe. In the US the market is dominated by the Agency MBS.
These are securities backed by the US agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
4Note that in these gures all volumes have been converted using the $/e exchange rate (as
end of quarter).
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Table 4: European and US Securitization Issuance. Data Source, Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association.
Table 4 shows the growth of the securitization market in US and Europe between
2000 and 2009. Clearly the size of these two markets is substantially di¤erent.
Furthermore, while in the US, the securitization market started to lack speed in
2005, it was still growing in Europe.
The securitization market was the most exciting and fastest growing sector in
the nancial markets before the nancial crisis. But the market has not only been
dynamic in USA and Europe but also in other countries. For example, in Canada
outstanding ABS exceeded C$100 billion in 2004, increased to C$105.3 billion in
2005 and there is not much change today (see Table 5).
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Table 5: Canadian Securitization Market Size. Source, Canadian National Bank.
Although public opinion has mainly focused on what went wrong with securitiza-
tion, there are many economic benets associated with it. For example, it is widely
recognized that securitization helps banks to re-allocate credit risk outside the bank-
ing system to entities which are better equipped to manage it (thus securitization
helps banks to e¤ectively manage credit and liquidity risk)5.
5One of the reasons why this had not happened during the booming age, was due to banks hold-
ing on to their balance sheets ABS issued by other banks. Consider as an example the mortgage
market, according to the IMF, in the middle of 2006 banks held about 51% of the total exposure
of the nancial institutions to the mortgage market. Thus, a relevant proportion of nancial insti-
tutions had, in e¤ect, a signicant "skin-in-the-game". Most of the banks holding these securities
were ill-equipped to properly evaluate them and did not have a sound system of risk management
in place. Additionally, these institutions were allowed to buy underpriced protection (against ABS
securities) from large insurance companies such as AIG.
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3 The Collapse of the ABS Market
The current crisis in US and Europe has followed a pattern that has been played
out for decades. The crisis was preceded by excessive borrowing and a speculative
bubble across di¤erent asset classes. Investors (particularly "non sophisticated"
investors) had such a condence in the securitization market that they were willing
to buy subprime mortgages or very complex instruments such as CDO2 which they
did not understand.
From the summer of 2007, as a consequence of the subprime crisis in the US, the
ABS market has su¤ered large losses, with the mortgage market hit by the largest
losses. Probably the turning point of the recent crisis was the collapse of Lehman
Brothers which hit hard an already shaking nancial system. As a result, spreads
on securitized products soared and market activity across di¤erent segments of the
market suddenly stopped. Thus, the ABS market started to shrink even more, but
bond issues backed by residential mortgages were the hardest a¤ected. To help to
restore liquidity and support the markets, in November 2008 the Fed introduced the
Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and spreads have largely dropped
since then6.
ABS dealers as well as banks were holding ABS structures on their balance sheets
and were unable to sell them simply because there was no buyer. Indeed, investors
were "ying" towards quality assets such as Treasury bills. Following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers investors became even more reluctant to enter the ABS market.
In such an illiquid market, it was very di¢ cult to obtain a reasonable price for these
securities7.
4 Inside the ABS market
Structuring an ABS deal involves di¤erent people at di¤erent levels of the chain.
For example the originator (for example banks and credit card issuers) pools the
assets. The pool is then sold to an SPV. The SPV will act as an intermediary
between the originator of the pool and the ABS issuer. Investors will nally buy
the tranches o¤ered in the market. The di¤erent people along the chain are indeed
likely to have di¤erent information about the security. For example, the ABS issuer
6In e¤ect, with the institution of the TALF, the Fed has acted as a lender of last resort as
nancial institutions were no longer able to raise funds using the securatisation market. Smaller
non-banks lenders have been the ones most a¤ected since they could not have access to the TALF.
7We shall discuss in the next sections the relationship between asymmetry, market liquidity and
ABS price.
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can have better information about the price of the security. The same information
is likely to be unavailable to the investors8.
To simplify the discussion, suppose that there are only two parties involved in
structuring an ABS deal, namely, the issuer and the investor9. We assume that
the issuer possesses more information about the security than the investor. The
informational advantage may consist, for example, in private information about the
future cash ow of the security or sophisticated models to price it. Thus, there is
a degree of asymmetric information between the issuer and the investor10. Suppose
that the issuer has a high preference for liquidity and she uses the securitization
market to raise cheap funds11. Also suppose that the issuer sells a fraction q 2
[0; 1] of the security and retain the remaining part on her balance sheet12. Thus,
investors may rationally anticipate that the issuer will sell a greater amount of the
security when her private information implies a lower value of the security (lemon
problem13). It follows that the investor will rationally o¤er a lower price for the
security. Retention in this case is a credible signal (i.e. it is a nancial decision
which conveys information). Since we have assumed that the issuer has a high
preference for liquidity, the market asymmetry produces a "liquidity cost"14. We
use the model proposed in De Marzo and Du¢ e (DD) (1999) to investigate this issue
further.
The demand function for the security is depicted in Figure 1, where f can be
interpreted as the expected payo¤of the security using the issuers valuation model15:
8Issuers in the ABS market are generally investment bank, which have the know-how to better
price the securities. Investors are generally pension funds or even retail banks. However, asym-
metric information can also be due to rating agencies valuing the security. For example, generally,
banks ask a few rating agencies to rate a structure, they have then the option to buy the best rate.
Information about the credit ratings of all the agencies involved are normally not discosed to the
public.
9This general assumption has no implication for our analysis.
10That is, the investor knows that the issuer has private informations about the security which
are unavailable to her.
11This might be due to protable investments in the market.
12Obviously retention is costly since there are investment opportunities and because the issuer
will have to post capital against the retained proportion of security.
13The lemon problem occurs because of information asymmetry between the buyer and the seller
(i.e. the seller has more information about the product being sold than the buyer).Thus, the buyer
uses the quantity of the product sold by the seller as a signal of the quality of the product itself.
14This happens as the issuer has a high preference for liquidity given the available investment
opportunities. Therefore there is a cost/opportunity between the sale of the security and retention
which the issuer will have to consider.
15This should not be confused with the price of the security o¤ered by investors.
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Figure 1: Prot Function
The demand function for the security is decreasing and convex. Investors are
naturally concerned about the security that they are being o¤ered since they antic-
ipate that the seller has private information that they do not know. Thus, the price
o¤ered for the security will be higher, the larger the proportion (q) of the security
retained by the seller on the balance sheet. The optimal quantity of the security
o¤ered by the issue is therefore decreasing. This is consistent with the fact that the
issuer will sell less of the security, when its expected payo¤ is higher. Thus, there is
an endogenous relationship between the quantity of the security put on sale and its
market price. Furthermore, there is a direct link between the degree of asymmetry
in the market, and the issuers prot. We shall investigate this issue further in the
next section.
5 Rescuing the ABS Market
Figure 2 below shows the prot from securitization for di¤erent face values of the
debt issued. The prot is plotted for di¤erent degree of asymmetry, ranging from low
asymmetry (m = 1%) to high asymmetry (m = 14%). We have used an extension
11
of the DD (1999) model to simulate the prot16
Fig. 2: Securitization Prot
The prot from securitization falls as the "lemon" problem becomes worse. Indeed,
when m is very high (i.e. the degree of asymmetry is very high), the issuer will have
to retain a larger proportion of the security and thus faces higher holding costs17.
There are two important things which can be learned from Figure 2. Firstly,
when the "lemon" problem is very persistent (as it happens to be during a nancial
crisis), any marginal proportion of the security put on sale in the market is likely to
16The prot from securitization is the value of the unsold fraction (1   q) of the security plus
the cash ow from the sale of the proportion (q) of the security. Thus given q, the issuer issues an
amount of debt with face value d.
In this exercise we have assumed a retention cost  = 98%. The retention cost is the value
to the issuer of the unissued security or the discount rate used by the issuer to discount the
future cash ows from the unissued security. Thus, given that the issuer has a high preference for
liquidity, the lower , the higher the cost of holding the assets. Since in our simulation exercise the
total (expected) cash ow from the underlying assets is $100, such a value for  implies that the
maximum expected prot from securitization, because of the lemon problem, is bounded below $2
(i.e. 1  ).
17The issuer will be forced to post more capital against the security and therefore she will have
less capital available for investments.
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have a substantial impact on its market price (and therefore on the issuers prot).
On the other hand if the lemon problem is not a substantial issue (m = 1%), the
issuer may issue bonds with large face value (d =1)18. In this case, we have a pure
pass-through security19.
Figure 2 can help to better understand the economic implications of most of the
regulatory proposals being discussed these days. In fact, di¤erent proposals have
been suggested to reform and re-start the ABS market. For example the White
Paper (2010) proposed by the Association of Mortgage Investors, the SEC (2010)
and the EU proposals.
Amongst the many di¤erent proposals contained in the SEC (2010) document,
we shall discuss a few which, we believe, are important. The SEC (2010) document
recommends a xed proportion (5%) of the security to be retained on the issuers
balance sheet (the so called "skin in the game"). The risk retention approach aims
to distinguish those securities which are of a su¢ cient quality while avoiding the
reliance on ratings. In other words, the issuer puts her money at stake with the
investors and consequently this should constitute an incentive to issue higher quality
securities. It is very likely that this proposal may have a substantial impact on the
ABS market liquidity in the future. If one believes that the proportion of the security
retained on the balance sheet constitutes a signal, then it is di¢ cult to understand
how a ve percent oor (or indeed any oor) can be chosen simply by regulation.
Indeed, following our discussion in the previous section, the proportion (q) of the
asset sold to investors constitutes a credible signal which the (uninformed) investor
can use to guess about the private information available to the issuer20. Of course a
higher degree of market transparency would probably make this signal less relevant.
However, the impact on the ABS market liquidity is probably underestimated.
Additionally, the SEC proposes the so called "new disclosure rules" for the ABS
market. ABS issuers, instead of relying on "principles" based disclosure, will have
to report specic information for each asset in the pool. This data should be made
available by the issuers to the public after ling of a computer program21. Given the
importance of these proposals, we shall discuss them further in the next sections.
18The securitization prot reaches an asymptotic limit at 1.3.
19Indeed in Europe several banks have used covered bonds instead of ABS securities to expand
the balance sheet.
20Issuers in the past have already held proportion of the issued security on their balance sheets.
However, generally, the proportion retained was a small proportion and therefore it would have
been unlikely to drive the issuer to focus on the quality of the loans. Furthermore, given the high
demand for high yield securities in the past fteen years, the incentive for the issuer to sell the
retained security was very high.
21The SEC goes much further than that to also suggest that this information should then regu-
larly be updated when assets in the pool change, etc...
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6 The E¤ect of the Recent Proposals
The proportion of the security retained by the issuer constitutes a credible signal
(i.e. the investor observes the proportion of the security put on sale by the issuer and
she uses this information to guess about the quality of the security). Suppose that
the proportion of the security retained by the issuer is xed by regulation. There
might be an incentive for the issuer to sell o¤ the largest possible part of the pool
in order to maximize the prot..Figure 3 below shows the relationship between the
issuers preference for liquidity, the face value of debt and the securitization prot.
We have assumed three di¤erent retention costs (i.e. 94%, 96% and 98%)22. As the
cost of reteining the assets increases (i.e. as  decreases) the issuer will issue debt
with larger and larger face value23. That is the issuer is issuing an equity tranche.
Fig. 3: Securitization prot
As a way to make the ABS market more transparent, the SEC also proposes new
22Thus, in the rst case the prot from securitization is expected below 6% of the $100; in the
second case below 4% of the 100$ and in the third case below 2% of the 100$.
23Up to a point when the issuer will issue a
pass-through security.
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disclosure rules for ABS issuers. The rationale being that more transparency in this
market is in the interest of both investors and issuers. As mentioned earlier the SEC
proposal favours the institution of a "machine-readable, standardized format that is
useful to investors and the market" (SEC, 2010). The SEC requires, for each asset
(loan) in the pool the disclosure of specic data relating to the terms of the asset,
obligor characteristics etc...
We believe that such a degree of disclosure is unnecessary and is likely to impact
negatively on the market. To see this, consider Figure 4 below
Fig. 4: Securitization prot
The blue curve shows the prot from securitization in the case disclosure is only
partial. The green curve shows the same prot when there is a full disclosure as
suggested by the SEC (2010) proposal. The drop in the prot (in the best case
scenario) is about 0.15. To understand the reasons for this fall in prot, suppose
that the price at which the security can be sold falls within the range [p0; p1]: Also,
assume that the investor faces no uncertainty about the security (i.e. the investor
has full disclosure of information of the pool and/or the security price). Given
that the investor has full information of the market demand for the security, it is
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reasonable to expect that the market price (P (q)) bid for the security is such that
P (q) = p0. That is, rationally, investors will be willing to o¤er p0 (the lower price)
for any proportion of the security sold in the market24.
7 Proposals for the future
The next couple of years will be crucial in establishing a new framework for the Over
the Counter Market (OTC). The ABS security market will be in "the line" of re.
Di¤erent proposals are being advanced. In the previous sections we have focused on
two. We have focused on two, which we believe are likely to have a severe impact
on the ABS market and concluded that, they may lead to a severe decline in the
liquidity of this market. Given the importance of the ABS market for the whole
economy, we need empirical evidence assessing the impact of these proposals on the
economy. In this section we shall make some recommendations.
Two main conclusions can be reached from the discussion above: rstly, given
the high cost for the issuer to retain a larger proportion of the security, and given
the market asymmetry, investors rationally anticipate the demand curve and they
interpret the proportion of the security put on sale by the issuer as a credible sig-
nal25. Secondly, as gure 4 shows, if the market asymmetry is largely removed by
regulations, the prot for the issuer may fall signicantly which, in the last instance,
may imply that most of the ABS products will disappear.
As discussed earlier, the e¤ect of the introduction of a xed oor is largely
unknown and also it is not yet obvious how this policy should be implemented
(see Fender et al, 2009)26. Alternatively, we suggest disclosing informations on the
quantity of the issued security that has been put on sale and the proportion of the
same security retained on the balance sheet. Investors may use this information to
infer about the quality of the security. Should the sponsor retain the security for a
period of time before re-selling it? Once again, we believe that the best approach is
full disclosure of the proportion of the (retained) security put on sale. Furthermore,
as noted in Du¢ e (2007) the issuer (sponsor) may have an incentive to develop a
reputation by retaining a proportion of the bond for a long period. What about
24This may have serious implications for the market. In fact, given its unique characteristics
and due to adverse selection, the release of more public information may reduce market liquidity.
25It is not a coincidence that sponsors in the ABS market already used to retain a proportion
of the security, and it is typical practice for credit card ABS market. The model above claries
the reason why that happened. Thus, the retention of a proportion of the security may have very
little to do with the "inability or lack of incentive to sell those securities" as suggested by the SEC
(2010) document.
26However, under technical regularity conditions, Innes (1990) shows that the optimal security
to retain is pure equity, which is, in e¤ect, what has generally happened in the past.
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investors? Should investors retain the security for a certain period? Why should
they be asked to do so? Investors (and not only speculators) generally buy a security
at a lower price and sell it at a higher price. Why should it not then be the same in
this case?27.
The SEC has proposed the adoption of new rules for the disclosure requirements
for ABS securities: specic data on each loan or asset in the pool, obligor character-
istics, description of the methodology used to calculate the pool performance and
computer program to run the cash ow provisions of the transaction (waterfall).
Thus, the issuer (sponsor) is obliged to ling a computer program of the contrac-
tual cash ow provisions of the securities and all the information cited earlier. This
information should be made available to investors in full. We have discussed the
possible impact on the ABS market of the "full disclosure approach" above. We
believe that full disclosure may have a substantial impact on the market (see the
example above). To mitigate this e¤ect we propose that investors should only have
access to aggregate information rather than specic informations28. The informa-
tion made available to investors should include factors such as illiquidity for that
category of assets, credit risk and also model risk. On the other hand, one may
think of a regulatory body to whom sponsors (originators) should be obliged to re-
port full information on the security (including the methodology used to obtain the
price). In this way the new body will have a clear picture of the overall systemic
risk and bankss total risk exposure. Information can be disclosed in aggregate form,
considering similar deals conducted in the market29.
8 Conclusion
The new regulatory framework for the ABS market may lead it to loose the at-
tractiveness as a funding tool. This study has reviewed recent developments in this
market and focused on two recent regulatory proposals (SEC, 2010), namely xed
retention oor of the security and new disclosure principles. The study concluded
that, if implemented, these policies are likely to have a major impact on the liquid-
ity of the ABS market. The recent crisis in the ABS market has more to do with
27It has been suggested that under this proposal one would better ensure that the resale is not a
distribution. We do not see anything wrong with the old model based on the distribution approach.
Afterall, it is not a model which causes a crisis but it is the way the model is interpreted and used.
Regulators should probably focus on this point.
28This would also encourage investors to invest in technology and know-how for research.
29This can follow the same approach as for the aggregate CDS position data released by DTCC
(see also discussion in Du¢ e et al, 2010).
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reputational concerns than retention policy. This study suggests using alternative
approaches which should alleviate the pressure on originators (issuers). It is impor-
tant that regulators nd the right balance between maintaining a su¢ cient interest
in the securitization market and at the same time avoid the errors made in the past.
To do this, we need theoretical as well as empirical studies to analyze the impact of
the new regulatory framework on the securitization market and the economy as a
whole. The availability of information to market participants is crucial for the cor-
rect functioning of the securitization market. However, full disclosure of information
may not be the key to restart the market. Indeed, it may even reduce the market
liquidity.
The goal of regulation should be to preserve the benets deriving from the ABS
market while achieving important public policy objectives, including nancial sta-
bility, investor protection, and market integrity. Devising an appropriate regulatory
response to nancial innovation is challenging. The introduction of the regulations
discussed in this study may well lead to either the shut-down of the securitization
market (or at least a signicant reduction of the market), or to the rise of riskier
instruments30.
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30For example for the case of Collateralised Loan Obligation (CLO), Du¢ e (2007), based on
Innes (1990), shows that if the cost of e¤ort (for the issuer) of controlling for the quality of the
loan in the pool is very high, the issuer will simply sell the entire loan portfolio, making minimal
e¤ort.
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